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ABSTRACT 
The working paper asks whether the millennium development goals (MDGs) have 
created opportunities for enlarging pro-poor policy choices at the country level.  
It concludes that in most countries the policy framework is not yet aligned with the 
fundamental objective of reducing human poverty. Poverty reduction continues to 
be seen as an automatic by-product of economic growth and macroeconomic 
stability. Governments and their partners find it difficult to translate the concept of 
‘pro-poor growth’ into practice. Equity continues to be the big absentee in most 
anti-poverty strategies. 
Although the objective of reducing human poverty features prominently on 
the international agenda, its actual pursuit remains conventional, unimaginative 
and often ineffective. Poverty reduction strategies also look strikingly similar, even 
for countries that face very different challenges. It is tragic that countries with high 
HIV prevalence rates have a macroeconomic framework that is not dissimilar from 
that for countries without HIV/Aids. 
If the MDG targets are to be achieved, then poverty reduction strategies will 
have to make a quantum leap in public investment, in domestic resources 
mobilisation, in external assistance and debt relief as well as in meaningful trade 
concessions. The era of targeted, small-scale anti-poverty interventions is over.  
If small is beautiful, big is now indispensable. 
The paper disputes the view that MDG targets are ‘easily set but never met’. 
For a target-driven approach to be successful, seven “do’s” are suggested. 
Too often, the partnership between rich and poor countries puts the emphasis 
on aspects related to ‘money changing hands’ at the expense of the dimension of 
‘ideas changing minds’. Yet, real change is ultimately an act of freedom, not an act 
of compliance with rules and conditionalities associated with ‘money changing 
hands’. A Peer & Partner Review is proposed for making the periodic consultation 
between a developing country and its external partners less asymmetric and more 
substantively focused on pro-poor policy choices. 
“There are times when the enunciation of even the most elementary common 
sense has an aspect of eccentricity, irrationality, even mild insanity.” 
J. K. Galbraith 
                                                 
* Leader, Poverty Group, United Nations Development Programme. Email: jan.vandemoortele@undp.org 
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1  THE DEVELOPMENT COIN 
The partnership between rich and poor countries takes many forms but its most 
explicit expression is embodied in foreign aid — formally known as official 
development assistance or ODA. Foreign aid is a coin with two faces; one side 
deals with issues associated with ‘money changing hands’; the other side 
addresses the aspects of ‘ideas changing minds’. 
The former covers the important aspects of budgeting, accountability and 
transparency. It addresses the questions of where to spend aid money — 
geographically and sectorally — and how to spend it — direct budget support vs. 
technical assistance; bilateral vs. multilateral channels; government vs. non-
government organisations; development vs. humanitarian programmes; project 
vs. programme aid; etc. Concerns about procurement, accounting and reporting 
are important but they tend to overshadow the debate about the purpose of aid. 
In essence, that side of the coin represents a one-way street focused on money 
matters, often leading to micro-management at the expense of the larger question 
about the ultimate role of development assistance. 
When the partnership is too much focused on money issues, little time and 
energy are devoted to the crucial dimension of ‘ideas changing minds’. Also, once 
money is put on the table, the nature of the partnership between poor and rich 
countries changes radically. However, it is only when the ultimate purpose of 
foreign aid is made clear and agreed upon between the recipient and the donor 
beforehand — mostly through active listening on the part of the latter — that its 
effectiveness and efficiency will improve measurably. Indeed, the issues related  
to ‘ideas changing minds’ involve a two-way traffic for advancing a genuine 
partnership, based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and  
national ownership. 
In this working paper, we focus on the dimension of ‘ideas changing minds’. 
We ask whether the millennium development goals (MDGs) have created 
opportunities for enlarging pro-poor policy choices at the country level, especially 
through the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). We examine whether 
policy frameworks are becoming MDG-friendly and we look into the potential role 
of external partners in engendering pro-poor policies. We highlight three “don’ts” 
when making the policy framework pro-poor. We conclude by asking whether 
global targets really make a difference. 
Before examining these central questions, we describe the differences in 
perception that surround the MDGs; we review some of the issues concerning 
the MDG indicators; and we summarise the progress made towards the targets in 
the 1990s. 
2  ARE THE MDGs A STEP FORWARD, SIDEWAYS OR 
BACKWARDS? 
The MDGs (see box) are subject to different views and perceptions. Some see them 
as a major step forward because they represent an internationally agreed agenda   Jan Vandemoortele  3 
 
for human development, something that has eluded the international community 
so far. Others see the MDGs as a step sideways because they represent a familiar 
agenda that is rather minimal in scope. Still others see the MDGs as a step 
backwards. They argue that the quantitative and time-bound targets do not 
explicitly cover human rights, reproductive health, jobs, inequality, good 
governance or the role of the private sector. Neither do they adequately address 
concerns about gender equality and environmental sustainability. 
 
The millennium development goals, or MDGs, are a set of measurable and time-bound 
targets that were adopted at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. Achieving them would 











halve the proportion of people suffering from extreme poverty and hunger; 
guarantee that all children complete primary school; 
ensure that girls and women have the same opportunities as boys and men;  
reduce by two thirds a child’s risk of dying before age five; 
reduce by three quarters a mother’s risk of dying from pregnancy-related causes; 
halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and adequate 
sanitation; 
stop and reverse the spread of HIV, malaria & TB; 
protect the world’s ecosystems and biodiversity; 
give people greater access to essential medicines; 
grant debt relief, give foreign aid and offer trade opportunities. 
 
Thus, the MDGs can be seen as either an agreed agenda, a minimalistic 
agenda or an incomplete agenda for human development. The fact of the matter is 
that the MDGs were not developed from scratch; they resulted from an 
incremental and sometimes piecemeal process of generating a political consensus 
on the elements of a global development agenda — mostly through a series of 
world summits and international conferences of the 1990s. 
Given these profound differences in perceptions, it might be useful to 
paraphrase John F. Kennedy by inverting his famous statement in that we should 
not ask what we can do for the MDGs but what the MDGs can do for our cause — 
the realisation of fundamental economic and social rights. That approach is likely 
to broaden the constituency in favour of the millennium development goals.  
The different views often stem from different paradigms. Some consider the 
MDGs as a new global compact between rich and poor countries, while others see 
the MDGs as an old paradigm of welfare entitlements or North-South recriminations. 
Those who take the latter position often view the ‘new’ paradigm as development 
that is driven by good governance and the private sector. Different views also exist 
as to the relevance of MDGs. Some people limit their relevance to low-income 
countries or the least developed countries while others see them as essential for 4  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 3  
addressing human poverty in all developing countries, including in middle-income 
countries where pockets of deep poverty persist. 
Many of these targets will either be met together or not at all. For example, 
estimates suggest that an additional year of education of the mother reduces child 
mortality by about one-tenth. Education also proves to be a potent ‘vaccine’ against 
HIV infection. Greater access to safe water improves both the health and education 
profile of the population. Without more aid, fairer trade and steeper debt relief, 
most MDGs will remain unmet. 
3  CAN ALL MDG INDICATORS BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE? 
Before assessing MDG progress, we point out that not all indicators offer equally 
good gauges of reality. All economic and social indicators are based on two 
ingredients: observation and construction, but not all use these ingredients in the 
same proportion. The reliability of an indicator tends to decline as more construction 
is involved because construction is based on assumptions. Statistics on water, for 
instance, frequently overstate access in urban areas because they report that all 
residents within 100 metres of a public supply point as adequately covered, based 
on the assumption that one single pump or tap can cover the needs of 500 or 1,000 
residents within that radius — always assuming that the tap or pump is actually in 
good working order. 
In education, it is easier to observe whether a child is enrolled in school than to 
estimate whether she will complete primary education — because of the possibility 
of repetition, dropout, re-entry and ultimate dropout. Hence, the indicator called 
‘completion rate’ is more problematic than the ‘enrolment ratio’ because the former 
needs more construction. Similarly, it is not possible to visit a village or a slum and 
observe whether someone earns less than $1 per day; whereas it is possible to 
observe whether a child survived her fifth birthday or whether she is malnourished. 
As income poverty cannot be readily observed, it needs a large set of information 
and a complex process of construction — creating many occasions for errors and 
omissions to occur. 
The world reportedly made impressive progress in the fight against income 
poverty during the 1990s. The proportion of the population in developing countries 
below $1 per day is estimated to have declined from about one-third in 1990 to 
less than one-quarter in 2000. But the poverty data produced by the World Bank 
show that the global trend is heavily influenced by two countries — China and India. 
When they are excluded, the global poverty performance during the 1990s 
becomes one of stagnation, even regression — not of remarkable progress. This 
illustrates how the level of aggregation can influence claims about MDG trends. 
What is valid at one level of aggregation is not necessarily valid at another level. 
The same is true for the choice of the indicators. What is valid based on one 
indicator is not always valid for another indicator. After reviewing four different 
definitions and measurements of poverty, Laderchi et. al. [2003] concluded, “What 
is striking is that low levels of poverty according to one measure are compatible 
with high levels of poverty according to another.” Therefore, one always needs to   Jan Vandemoortele  5 
 
be aware and to beware. The choice of the indicator and the level of aggregation 
at which the analysis is done invariably influence the claims and conclusions made 
in social sciences. 
Another factor that can influence the interpretation of data is the time horizon 
or the base year. Whilst it is true, for instance, that the reduction in the under-five 
mortality rate in developing countries has been impressive — dropping from an 
average of 223 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 91 in 2000 — it is equally true that 
the progress made in the 1990s was much slower than that witnessed in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Base years and time horizons are sometimes chosen to hide the lack of 
progress in recent years behind rapid progress of earlier decades. Hence, the choice 
of the time horizon can shape the claims and conclusions about MDG progress — or 
the lack thereof. 
In short, all indicators are imperfect but some are more imperfect than others. 
Among the most frequently used MDG indicators, we prefer the following top-five 
for their reliability, coverage and relevance: (i) under-five mortality rate, (ii) 
underweight among children, (iii) net enrolment ratio in primary education, (iv) 
ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary schools, and (v) the proportion of 
births attended by skilled health personnel. On the other hand, the five we consider 
most problematic include: (a) proportion of the population below $1 per day,  
(b) proportion of the population below a minimum level of dietary energy 
consumption, (c) primary completion rate, (d) maternal mortality ratio and (e) the 
proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water. These indicators 
involve a high dose of construction, which can easily lead to esoteric statistics. 
4  ARE WE ON TRACK TO MEETING THE MDGS BY 2015? 
The MDGs are morally imperative and legally binding — as they are embedded in 
human rights treaties. They are technically feasible and financially affordable.  
They also make good economic sense. Yet, all is not well with the MDGs. Although 
all member states of the United Nations pledged to “spare no effort to free our 
fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanising conditions  
of extreme poverty” [UN, 2000], global progress towards the MDGs has been slow 
and uneven. 
Without denying the great diversity in performance across countries, the story 
of the 1990s can be summarised in three main points. First, progress was made but 
it was too slow for reaching the agreed targets by 2015. Second, in many cases less 
progress was made in the 1990s than in the 1970s and 1980s. Third, much of the 
progress by-passed the poor. The countries and the people who most needed to 
see progress frequently saw the least of it. 
The 1990s were characterised by an unprecedented number of cases where 
human development reversed. The number of countries that saw a decline in their 
human development index rose to 21 in the 1990s, up from 4 during the 1980s 
[UNDP, 2003a]. Most of the reversals stemmed from the HIV/Aids pandemic and 
economic crises, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and in the transition economies. 
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did not lead to faster and more robust progress in terms of human development. 
After all, the ‘roaring’ 1990s were associated with booming foreign direct 
investment and soaring trade flows — all part of the phenomenon of globalisation. 
As of 2000, the world was reportedly on track for only two targets — income 
poverty and access to safe water. Both, however, have serious measurement 
problems and might be on ‘statistical steroids’. Global poverty trends that are 
based on the metric of $1 per day cannot be considered as a robust source of 
information. 
Regrettably, a dollar per day does not keep poverty at bay. A growing number 
of analysts argue that the international poverty line of $1 or $2 per day is not a 
good gauge [Reddy & Pogge, 2003]. After examining cross-country data on 
underweight and income poverty — using both national and international poverty 
lines — Morrisson [2002] concluded, “the number of malnourished children is 
correlated to the number of poor individuals if we use the national poverty line; 
they are less satisfactory, however, when we use the measure of $1 per day.” 
Indeed, many analysts agree that the use of a national poverty line is preferable to 
the use of the international poverty line of $1 per day. The inherent drawbacks  
of a fixed international poverty line, combined with inaccurate conversion rates 
into purchasing power parity, argue for an extremely cautious interpretation of the 
poverty data. 
As for the water target, the picture is also clouded by measurement problems 
and by the fact that much of the progress of the 1990s may not be sustainable as 
many parts in the world face growing water shortages. 
During the 1990s, most targets for hunger, health, education, and gender 
equality witnessed about half the progress they should have seen in order to reach 
their agreed goalposts by 2015. For HIV/Aids, little or no progress was achieved apart 
from a few countries. Progress towards building a global partnership for human 
development — the so-called MDG-8 in terms of aid, trade and debt relief — was 
also disheartening.Perhaps most disappointing of all is the situation vis-à-vis 
primary education. An estimated 115 million children are ‘out of school’ and 
perhaps three times as many are ‘out of education’ — in the sense that they do not 
acquire basic literacy and numeracy. There is no good reason to explain this sorry 
state of affairs.  
The cost of universal primary education is perfectly affordable [Delamonica et. al., 
2004]; no new technologies are needed to make it a reality; everyone agrees that it 
makes good economic sense; and basic education is universally seen as a basic 
human right. 
If these arguments do not convince policy-makers about the absolute 
necessity of reaching the education goal, then we can only wonder what it will 
take to meet the other MDGs. Sadly, the failure to keep the education promise  
will undermine the chances of reaching the other targets because of its high 
instrumental value. New HIV infections, for instance, are disproportionately 
concentrated among young illiterate women — supporting the existence of a  
so-called ‘education vaccine’ against HIV [Vandemoortele & Delamonica, 2000].   Jan Vandemoortele  7 
 
The above picture does not get any brighter when we look beyond global and 
national averages. Not only was progress inadequate in most countries during the 
1990s, much of it by-passed the poorest countries and the poorest people.  
The least progress occurred where most progress was needed — both across and 
within countries. Slow ‘average’ progress was frequently compounded by limited 
progress for the poorest and most disadvantaged groups within countries. 
Quantitative targets are primarily meant to help improve the situation of poor 
people, not only that of better-off and privileged people. Unfortunately, the poor 
have benefited proportionately little from ‘average’ progress, as evidenced by 
widening disparities within countries in terms of education, nutrition and health 
[Minujin & Delamonica, 2003]. 
In sum, the world is not on track to meeting the global MDG targets by 2015; 
it is even difficult to argue that the glass is half full. While progress was made in the 
1990s it was slower than that observed in the 1970s and 1980s, and too much of it 
by-passed the countries and the people who were most in need of it. 
Moreover, the way the global MDGs were formulated is not conducive to 
success because the HIV pandemic was acknowledged but not really internalised. 
By and large, global MDG targets were set on the premise that the global trends 
observed in the 1970s and 1980s would continue till 2015 — i.e. during the lifetime 
of one generation. While a separate target for halting and reversing HIV was 
inserted in the Millennium Declaration, the quantitative targets for health, water, 
education, income poverty, and hunger were set as if no HIV pandemic existed — 
thereby ignoring the undeniable fact that HIV is slowing down global progress in 
health and beyond. 
Yet, meeting the MDGs is not ‘mission impossible’; they remain doable 
propositions. While the 1990s failed to generate the desired progress, it is not too 
late to avoid the legacy of this generation from becoming a series of broken 
promises. Experience shows that determined leadership and awakened public 
interest can put the world back on the MDG track. This is exactly what happened in 
the 1960s when the US Administration decided to send a man to the moon. At the 
time, nobody knew how to realise that technological feat, let alone how much it 
would cost; yet it was turned into a practical reality. The same can be achieved for 
the MDGs — given strong political leadership and deliberate public advocacy for 
the MDG targets at the local, national and global levels. 
5  ARE POLICY FRAMEWORKS MDG-FRIENDLY? 
Poverty reduction strategies continue to look strikingly similar, even for countries 
that face very different challenges. If they were genuinely homegrown, it would 
not be unreasonable to expect that anti-poverty strategies would look a lot more 
diverse and different. Actually, most of them are little different from the policy 
framework prescribed during the era of structural adjustment of the 1980s, apart 
from the important fact that they now make a stronger case for pro-poor public 
expenditure. Growth continues to be seen as the panacea, and macroeconomic 
stability, financial deregulation and trade liberalisation as its prerequisites. But not 8  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 3  
everybody shares the same faith in the power of economic growth for reducing 
human poverty. 
China, for instance, is frequently looked at with admiration and awe as rapid 
growth reportedly led to a steep reduction in income-poverty. Between 1981 and 
2001, nearly 400 million people are estimated to have escaped poverty [World 
Bank, 2004a]. Yet, the link between growth and poverty remains a bit of a mystery. 
Over the last five years of that period, for example, the Chinese economy 
expanded by about one-half; yet the number of poor people (i.e. those below $1 
per day) remained unchanged. It is a moot question why such impressive growth 
between 1996 and 2001 failed to make a difference for the estimated 212 million 
people who struggled to survive on less than $1 a day in that country. 
The centennial anniversary of the invention of flying offers an interesting 
analogy. The main protagonists in designing the first flying machine in the early 
1900s were Samuel Langley and the Wrights Brothers. With generous support from 
the Defence Department — the called the War Department — Langley’s strategy 
was to use brute power to get his theoretically stable machine aloft. The Wright 
Brothers, on the other hand, developed an engine that was less powerful because 
they understood that moderate power combined with smart design would be 
sufficient to get airborne. The analogy is not unlike the different paradigms between 
those who believe in the overwhelming power of economic growth to reduce 
human poverty and those who argue that the pattern of growth and the design of 
pro-poor policies are at least as important as the rate of economic growth. 
In practice, few of the macroeconomic policy reforms explicitly consider their 
impact on the poor. A recent IMF review, for instance, concluded that none of the 
documents that supported the poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) 
“present a rigorous study assessing poverty and social impact” [Inchauste, 2002].  
A strong commitment to the MDGs would imply that the objective of reducing 
human poverty drives the policy framework, not the other way round. 
Most PRSPs have generated more inclusive public debates and policy 
dialogues, but participation by itself does not guarantee pro-poor outcomes.  
An evaluation commissioned by UNDP [2003c] regarding its role in the PRSP 
process found little or no correlation between the breath of participation and the 
policy content of the PRSP. Stewart & Wang [2003] also concluded, “PRSPs do not 
significantly empower poor countries.” An Oxfam paper [2004] reports that out of 
20 countries, 16 had an agreed PRGF prior to the completion of the PRSP — thereby 
severely limiting the influence of national stakeholders over macroeconomic 
target setting. Representatives from line ministries, trade unions, civil society and 
academia are beginning to feel that they are involved in a process of ‘choiceless’ 
participation. All sense severe limitations for generating homegrown strategies. 
Although the significance of basic services is now recognised more broadly, 
few poverty reduction strategies explicitly align their policy framework with the 
MDGs. The IMF [2003] reported, for instance, that low-income countries cut 
inflation and import tariffs by half over the past decade, reduced their budget 
deficits and improved their foreign exchange reserves; yet by its own admission 
these countries made little progress in terms of income growth and poverty   Jan Vandemoortele  9 
 
reduction. Nonetheless, the validity of the standard macroeconomic framework is 
not called into question. Instead, the tendency is to add new elements to the 
policy matrix in terms of structural reforms, improvements in the rule of law, 
enforcement of property rights and civil service reform. A more ambitious and 
accommodating policy framework focused on the MDGs is seldom considered. 
Most poverty reduction strategies fail to translate the concept of ‘pro-poor 
growth’ into specific and practical policy measures. An independent evaluation on 
the impact of the International Development Association (IDA) — the window  
of concessional lending at the World Bank — on poverty concluded, “the 
development outcomes of IDA programs have been partially satisfactory” [World 
Bank, 2001]. An independent evaluation of the PRS-approach (poverty reduction 
strategies) notes, “it has not yet fulfilled its full potential” [World Bank, 2004b]. 
These evaluations confirm that while macroeconomic stability improved and 
many economic distortions were removed, no strong evidence emerged as to 
whether the poor saw their income increase and their job opportunities improve.  
It proved difficult to come up with practical policies to achieve not just growth but 
equitable growth. Concrete measures were usually missing to transmit the benefits 
of policy reforms to the poor. 
The good news is that pro-poor growth is perfectly possible, as has been 
shown by the case of the Republic of Korea. After studying five Asian countries, 
Pernia [2003] concluded that Lao PDR was the longest distance away from 
generating pro-poor growth in the (pre-crisis) 1990s, followed by Thailand, the 
Philippines and Viet Nam — with the latter two coming close to achieving pro-poor 
growth. But the Republic of Korea was the only country that saw the income of the 
poor grow proportionately faster than average income. That country also confirms 
that initial conditions of equity — through successful land reform and deliberate 
health and education policies — do matter a great deal for reducing poverty in a 
sustainable manner. 
6  WHAT ARE PRO-POOR POLICIES? 
Although increasingly used, the term ‘pro-poor growth’ remains vague and 
general. Growth is pro-poor, it is argued, if it uses the assets that the poor own, if it 
favours the sectors where the poor work, and if it occurs in areas where the poor 
live. These obvious points, however, are seldom un-bundled into detailed reforms 
that make policy frameworks pro-poor in practice, not in theory. 
As is often the case, the devil is in the details. Once the objective of reducing 
human poverty is taken beyond the abstract level, it usually ceases to look as a 
‘universal good’. An honest search for real solutions to poverty invariably leads to 
hard trade offs and tough policy choices — hence the tendency of many to play it 
safe by sticking to conventional wisdom and generalities, even platitudes. 
Pro-poor policies imply that the social and economic conditions for the 
disadvantaged people improve more rapidly than those for the rest of society. It is 
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faster pace than for the non-poor because absolute poverty always has a relative 
dimension. Therefore, before being called ‘pro-poor’, the policy framework needs a 
thorough examination. 
We examine whether the standard elements of the policy framework are 
really pro-poor and whether it can be claimed that existing frameworks will meet 
the MDGs. Seven elements are highlighted, including fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies. They draw from lessons identified by UNDP’s review of how 
macroeconomic policies incorporate — or fail to incorporate — the objective 
poverty reduction in a number of Asian countries [McKinley, 2003]. 
6.1  AVOID A DOGMATIC VIEW OF THE ‘SMALL GOVERNMENT’ PARADIGM 
The first element covers fiscal policy. A policy framework that is focused on poverty 
reduction and on the MDGs must accommodate a more expansionary fiscal stance. 
The introduction of the PRSP and the PRGF are an implicit admission that reducing 
poverty has to go hand in hand with increased public spending and more flexible 
macroeconomic policies; yet their policy framework seldom goes beyond the 
paradigm of fiscal conservatism and monetary orthodoxy. The standard framework 
proposed by the International Financial Institutions seldom makes a strong case 
for increased taxation, although an overall tax rate of 10-12 per cent of national 
income is woefully inadequate for any government to keep its MDG promise. 
The standard macroeconomic framework is premised on keeping the size of 
the public sector to a strict minimum; based on the assumption that low taxes and 
limited regulation will stimulate investment and generate economic growth, 
which in turn will reduce poverty. Public investment programmes are often kept to 
a minimum, based on the argument that they crowd out private investment.  
This, however, is at odds with empirical evidence. Public investment in sectors 
such as energy, rural roads, irrigation and primary schools often stimulates private 
investment. Public investment was a key instrument for fostering growth and 
reducing human poverty in the Republic of Korea; and still plays that role in China 
and Viet Nam — two top performers vis-à-vis the MDG targets. 
But many governments lack public revenue to invest in growth and to fight 
poverty. Thus, government needs to raise more money, besides allocating it better. 
While most poverty reduction strategies now devote more attention to directing 
scarce budgetary resources to pro-poor public expenditure, few address the issue 
of raising more domestic revenue in a progressive way. Public revenue that 
accounts for 15 per cent or less of national income is grossly insufficient for 
reducing human poverty. In most developing countries, domestically raised 
revenue is too small, not too big. Trevor Manuel [2003], South Africa’s Finance 
Minister, recently stated, “Most African states need to expand, not contract, their 
public sector”. 
The tax systems in developing countries often make the poor pay 
proportionately more than the non-poor. The Inter-American Development Bank 
[1999], for instance, documents the regressive nature of the tax incidence for 
several Latin American countries. In the 1990s, trade liberalisation reduced the   Jan Vandemoortele  11 
 
significance of taxes on imports and exports as a source of public revenue. In many 
low-income countries, they were replaced by taxes on consumption, which tend to 
be more regressive than direct taxes. The lure of the value added tax (VAT) proved 
particularly irresistible. According to IMF data, the number of developing countries 
that adopted VAT more than doubled — to 73 in 2001 from 30 in 1989. By contrast, 
taxes on income and wealth remained low or benefited from generous loopholes 
and lax enforcement. The evidence clearly shows that the tax system in many 
countries has become less equitable and less pro-poor. Reforms are urgently 
needed in direct and indirect tax policies to generate more domestic resources for 
the MDGs and do so in a more progressive way. 
Winning the battle on pro-poor public expenditure was the result, at least in 
part, of the UN’s advocacy and analytical work, which crystallised in the form of the 
20/20 initiative [UNICEF, 1987; UNDP, 1990]. Endorsed at the 1995 Social Summit in 
Copenhagen, it calls for the allocation of an indicative 20 per cent of the national 
budget and 20 per cent of ODA to basic social services — comprising basic education, 
primary health, reproductive health, water and sanitation, and nutrition. The actual 
shares — as estimated for the mid-1990s — were both about 12 per cent [UNICEF 
& UNDP, 1998]. While both have shown a tendency to increase, faster progress 
from a 12/12 ratio to a 20/20 compact will be essential for reaching the MDGs. 
Thus, the next battle will focus on pro-poor public revenue. It would be 
incorrect to assume that most of the MDG funding gap will be financed from 
external sources. This would be an untenable proposition from an economic, 
financial and political perspective. While more — and better — foreign aid will 
be part of the solution, aid cannot be viewed as the principal source for funding 
priority spending at the country level. 
6.2  USE COST RECOVERY SPARINGLY 
When the policy framework is driven by low taxation, an alternative way of 
generating budgetary resources is through user fees. The merits of user financing 
will depend on the type of services. Charging fees for non-basic services is very 
different from charging for basic services. Since basic services are public goods 
with strong synergies and positive externalities, they should be either free or 
heavily subsidised — regardless of whether they are provided by public, private or 
non-governmental agencies. 
A dozen countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, currently charge fees for 
basic education. Fees are often justified on the ground of pragmatism. To reject 
them on the basis of principle, the argument goes, is to leave large segments of 
the population un-served for the foreseeable future. A review of experiences leads 
to a more cautious stance vis-à-vis user fees for basic social services [Reddy & 
Vandemoortele, 1996]. 
Despite the very modest amount of money they generate, user fees invariably 
lead to a reduction in the demand for services, particularly among the poor. 
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effective, although often expensive. The introduction of user fees also tends to 
aggravate gender discrimination. 
Whenever the option of cost sharing is contemplated, special attention needs 
to be paid to important details such as retaining the bulk of the revenue and its 
spending authority at the local level; ensuring that users will see an immediate 
improvement in the quality of the service (by using the extra money for inputs 
such as essential medicines, textbooks and spare parts for water pumps); 
accepting different types of contributions (in cash, in kind or in labour); 
implementing an exemption scheme that is based on measurable criteria agreed 
by the community; using graduated fees whenever possible to promote cross-
subsidisation; and conducting regular monitoring to adjust and improve the 
scheme — relying heavily on community participation. It is critical to demonstrate 
that user fees do not substitute for existing budgetary allocations. In the interest of 
both the users and the providers of services, it is important to maintain adequate 
regulation and oversight because self-policing has proved inadequate and 
ineffective — both for public agencies and private companies. 
Since the mid-1990s, school fees have been abolished in Malawi and Uganda 
and more recently in Kenya. That pro-poor policy was followed by a surge in 
enrolment in all three countries — with girls being the prime beneficiaries. These 
positive experiences illustrate that even a small nominal fee can be a formidable 
obstacle for poor families. Nevertheless, the sceptics argue that such measures 
generated short-lived gains. As enrolment increased, they claim, the quality of 
education dropped precipitously so that pupils and parents lost interest in primary 
schooling. They argue that the surge in enrolment was soon followed by a surge in 
dropout — nullifying most of the initial gains. Whilst it is true that the initial spike 
in enrolment levelled off in subsequent years, it cannot be denied that enrolment 
stabilised at a level that was considerably higher than the one that prevailed prior 
to the policy reform. Claiming that such policy reforms are ineffective for reducing 
human poverty is tantamount to making the perfect the enemy of the good. 
6.3  USE NARROW TARGETING WITH CAUTION 
Given severe fiscal constraints and limited options for user financing, most poverty 
reduction strategies recommend targeted interventions on narrowly defined social 
groups or geographical areas. Narrowly targeted programmes are increasingly 
prescribed for reasons of efficiency and cost savings — for they claim to minimise 
leakage to the non-poor. Obviously, the merits of targeting depend on what is 
being targeted. Targeting fertiliser subsidies or micro-credit, for instance, is very 
different from targeting vouchers for primary education or anti-malaria bednets. 
As far as basic services are concerned, narrow targeting can have huge hidden 
costs. They result from the fact that it is often difficult to identify the poor and to 
reach them because the non-poor — most of who remain ‘near-poor’ — seldom 
fail to capture a large part of subsidies destined for more destitute people. Also, 
administering narrowly targeted programmes is at least twice as costly as running 
untargeted ones. In addition, the poor must frequently document eligibility — 
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generate. Such out-of-pocket costs can be a real obstacle. Most importantly, 
however, is the fact that once the non-poor cease to have a stake in narrowly 
targeted programmes, the political commitment to sustain their scope and quality 
is at risk. The voice of the poor alone is usually too weak to maintain strong public 
support. That is why programmes meant to benefit exclusively the poor frequently 
end up as ‘poor’ programmes. 
As part of narrow targeting, many countries have launched social investment 
funds or social action programmes; but few of them have been institutionalised. 
They mostly remain under the political patronage of the President or the First 
Lady. Although social safety nets can lead to rapid responses in situations of crisis 
and emergency, they are seldom effective. Even if they are cost efficient, they are 
not necessarily effective because they are usually under-funded and seldom reach 
beyond an insignificant proportion of the poor. 
While narrow targeting, user fees, and social investment funds can play a role, 
they can never be the mainstay of a country’s anti-poverty strategy. In most 
contexts, they are likely to yield savings that are penny-wise but pound-foolish. 
High-achieving countries in terms of human development — such as Costa Rica, 
the state of Kerala (India), the Republic of Korea and Mauritius — all applied broad 
targeting; none of them relied on shortcuts through user fees, narrowly targeted 
programmes or social investment funds [UNICEF, 1995]. 
There is no doubt that public spending on basic services includes wastage but 
those who argue that existing budgets have to be used more efficiently before more 
public money can be invested fail to see that insufficiencies can — and often do — 
aggravate inefficiencies. In many instances, inefficiencies in public administration 
and governance result from the lack of adequate public resources to fund basic 
services. Indeed, inefficiencies and insufficiencies are not independent but very 
much interdependent. For example, when 98 per cent of the budget for primary 
education is needed to pay teacher salaries — a basic expense — there is little 
scope for improving the quality of education without raising the budgetary 
envelop first. In such cases, extra resources will be a prerequisite for enhancing the 
efficiency of public spending. 
6.4  SET INFLATION TARGETS THAT ARE NOT TOO TIGHT 
Mckinley [2003] and others have argued that tight inflation targets can hurt the 
poor. Out of 20 low-income countries reviewed by Oxfam [2003], 16 had an inflation 
rate of less than 5 per cent per year. The standard argument is that inflation is 
particularly bad for poor people because they are unable to maintain their level of 
consumption by drawing from savings. Therefore, stringent fiscal and monetary 
policies to achieve macroeconomic stability are assumed to be pro-poor — virtually 
by definition. However, the case that the poor are the prime victims of inflation is not 
a solid one. If the poor consume more own-produced goods and services than the 
non-poor — as is confirmed by numerous household studies — then they will be 
less affected by inflation because their consumption basket is less monetised. If 
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most vulnerable in situations of high inflation — mostly because they are unable to 
protect their modest assets against monetary erosion. 
What has been established is that moderate inflation is not damaging, neither 
for growth nor for the poor. Studies define moderate inflation within the range of 
5-30 per cent per year; mostly clustered around 10-15 per cent. Ultimately, the 
optimal rate of inflation will change in space and in time, and will be positively 
correlated with the rate of economic growth. While some will interpret this as a 
licence for big spending, huge deficits and hyperinflation, we simply point out that 
there is no strong evidence in support of the argument that very low inflation is 
either pro-growth or pro-poor. Actually, too low an inflation rate can be as harmful 
to the poor as too high a rate of inflation. 
All observers agree that hyperinflation and macroeconomic instability hurts 
the poor as well as the economy at large; but the objective of poverty reduction 
cannot be considered as an automatic by-product of macroeconomic stability.  
It cannot be assumed that any set of policies aimed at achieving price stability  
will always be pro-growth, pro-jobs and pro-poor. That would be an act of faith.  
It often reflects the false logic of opposites; whereby it is often assumed — either 
consciously or unconsciously — that when something does not work its opposite 
will work. For instance, if high inflation is bad for the poor then low inflation will 
always be good for the poor; if large budget deficits are bad for the economy then 
a budget surplus will always be good for economic growth; if autarchy is bad for 
the economy then free trade will always be good for the poor. Such thinking reduces 
the policy debate to rather simplistic ‘either-or’ options. At most, they set up straw 
men that fail to reflect the complexities and many nuances encountered in real 
situations. Moreover, straw men often prove highly flammable in policy debates. 
6.5  DEREGULATE FINANCIAL MARKETS WITH GREAT CARE 
The record of financial liberalisation has been neither pro-poor nor pro-growth.  
It often destabilised the economy and denied access of poor people to credit. Real 
interest rates have tended to rise and the spread between the deposit and lending 
rates has widened — both undercutting jobs and growth. Farm and non-farm 
enterprises often lost access to credit as banks focused on short-term lending for 
consumer durables in urban areas. Banks and corporations have frequently 
resorted to short-term external borrowing, making the country vulnerable to 
capital flight — and wreaking havoc in times of crisis, as was the case in East Asia in 
1997. After reviewing Latin America’s experience in recent years, Birdsall [2002] 
wrote, “The ‘villains’ among the reforms have not been trade liberalization or 
privatization, but financial sector reforms and the opening of the capital account.” 
Yet, financial liberalisation continues to be part of many so-called poverty 
reduction strategies. 
6.6  LIBERALISE TRADE CAUTIOUSLY 
Similarly, trade must be liberalised cautiously. Surging imports have had 
destabilising effects in many countries. The benefits from trade are often 
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the scope of the poor. Also, heavily subsided exports from rich countries—such as 
sugar, cotton, fruit, corn, meat and diary products — have played havoc with the 
livelihood of millions of smallholders in poor nations. A study by Carnegie [2003] 
concluded that NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) has hurt 
subsistence farmers in Mexico and that the expected gain in jobs did not 
materialise; neither did it prevent real wages from declining and income disparities 
from rising. It stated, “Trade agreements do not need to result in this kind of 
hardship for the world’s rural poor.” The study reconfirms that it is incorrect to 
assume that trade liberalisation will automatically yield outcomes that are pro-
poor, pro-jobs and pro-growth. 
UNDP [2003b] reviewed how the global trading system can help or hurt the 
prospects for human development in low-income countries. It supports the 
argument that open trade is more a result of development rather than a 
prerequisite for it. As countries grow richer, they gradually take advantage of new 
opportunities offered by global trade. Trade follows development; it seldom leads 
development. While recognising that no country has ever developed by keeping 
its borders closed, it is equally true that no country has developed by throwing 
open its borders to foreign trade. Current rules no longer allow countries to follow 
an export-led development strategy similar to that experienced by the so-called 
East-Asian tigers in the 1970s and 1980s because global trading rules have 
narrowed the policy space for individual countries to use selective export subsidies 
and import tariffs. 
The potential impact of trade on human poverty has also been affected by the 
entry into force of intellectual property rights. The TRIPS agreement (trade-related 
intellectual property rights) has gained public attention as patents have barred 
access to anti-retroviral medicines for millions of HIV-positive people in low-
income countries. The rules regarding intellectual property rights have to balance 
the dual objective of serving as an incentive for innovation and for guaranteeing 
fair access to its results for poor countries and poor people. On balance, the TRIPS 
agreement has erred in favour of the former. Moreover, there is no evidence that 
stronger patent protection has led to more research and innovation vis-à-vis 
tropical diseases. In sum, the days are gone when a pharmaceutical company gave 
away a profitable patent based on the conviction of its CEO that “medicine is for 
people not for profit” — a position taken by George W. Merck some 50 years ago 
when his company released its hold on the exclusive rights to the first antibiotic 
against tuberculosis. 
6.7  BRING EQUITY CONCERNS INTO THE POLICY DEBATE 
After reviewing the growth literature, Temple [1999] concluded, “it has become 
extremely difficult to build a case that inequality is good for growth.” Persson & 
Tabellini [1994] stated, “inequality is harmful for growth.” Ravallion [2000] wrote, 
“On balance, the existing evidence […] appears to offer more support for the view 
that inequality is harmful to growth”. A study by ECLAC, IPEA & UNDP [2002] 
concluded, “there is every reason to suspect that some amount of redistribution 
[…] might in fact contribute to more economic growth.” Williamson [2003] 16  International Poverty Centre  Working Paper nº 3  
admitted that if anything was omitted from his original ten-point reform agenda 
that came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, it was the need for 
“correcting the appallingly unequal income distributions that afflict the region 
[Latin America].” 
Nevertheless, most poverty reduction strategies overlook equity concerns, big 
time. At best, the existence of inequalities is recognised but concrete policies to 
reduce them remain absent. This is exemplified by gender equality, which 
continues to get scant attention in most anti-poverty plans; although gender 
equality is at the very heart of achieving the MDGs. A recent review by the World 
Bank [2003a] of 27 PRSPs reported that as many as 10 failed to include even the 
slightest recognition of the gender goal. 
It is incorrect to assume that higher ‘average’ income will automatically lead 
to less poverty; economic analyses raise the spectre of reasonable doubt. Research 
has documented the link between high inequality and slow economic growth. 
High inequality is not only harmful for the poor; it also inhibits economic growth; 
delays policy reforms and entrenches special interests. Thus, equity is good for the 
poor because it is good for growth. Growth alone is not the answer; only when the 
poor participate in, contribute to and benefit from economic growth will it make a 
measurable and lasting dent on human poverty. A little equity will go a long way 
towards reducing poverty. 
Our concern about equity is not solely driven by noble ideals and compassion; 
it is primarily motivated by the need for laying the foundation of a strong 
economy. A just society can only emerge when there is a level playing field at the 
starting line. Only when people are given the means to become agents of their 
own development, rather than recipients of aid or handouts, will poverty reduction 
be rapid and sustainable. 
Universal coverage of basic social services is key for ensuring equitable 
growth. Without their universal coverage, the virtuous circle of social and 
economic development will remain elusive. Once access to an integrated package 
of basic social services of good quality becomes universal, social progress and 
economic growth can be rapid and sustainable. 
7  CAN EXTERNAL PARTNERS PLAY A ROLE IN ENLARGING 
PRO-POOR POLICIES? 
It cannot be denied that foreign aid has made a difference in the past. Alongside 
fairer trade and steeper debt relief, more and better ODA will be indispensable for 
reaching the MDGs by 2015, particularly — but not exclusively — in the least 
developed and low-income countries. But let there be no doubt: the bulk of the 
extra investment in basic services and anti-poverty programmes will have to come 
from domestic resources, not from external sources. However, this does not 
diminish the marginal value of ODA. Indeed, foreign aid can play a critical role in 
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latter are bound to meet stiff resistance from several quarters. Budget 
restructuring, for instance, is never an easy task. 
Regrettably, the adoption of noble goals and targets at world summits and 
international conference of the 1990s did not prevent aid efforts from declining by 
one-third. Initiatives such as the Fast Track for Education-for-All; the Global Fund 
for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the Rollback Malaria initiative, and the HIPC 
Trust Fund have been all severely hampered by inadequate funding. It remains to 
be seen whether the Monterrey Consensus will reverse the trend. While early 
indications show a hesitant recovery, most observers agree that foreign aid is 
unlikely to recover the ground lost during the 1990s because the fiscal position has 
worsened in several donor countries since the promises for more aid were made. 
Also, as we move closer to 2015, foreign aid will increasingly compete with the 
rising costs of public health care and social security for the ageing population in 
Europe, Japan and North America. Hence, the sooner we see a major increase in 
aid, the better it will be for both rich and poor countries — for keeping the promise 
in the former and for reaching the MDGs in the latter. 
Showing that foreign aid can help improve the access of people to primary 
health care, basic education and safe water will make it easier to convince 
parliamentarians and the public in donor countries that aid has a tangible impact 
on the lives of poor people. A greater focus on basic social services, therefore, will 
help reverse the decline in ODA that was observed in the 1990s. 
As ODA has fallen, concerns about its effectiveness have risen. Greater 
scrutiny regarding aid’s effectiveness is welcome; areas that have seen progress in 
recent years include the untying of aid, directing it to activities that are likely to 
benefit the poor, and the pooling of donor resources. Donors increasingly accept 
to simplify and harmonise their rules, procedures and procurement so as to lower 
the transaction cost for the recipient country. Indeed, foreign aid can be very 
expensive for recipients — although this may sound as an oxymoron. Nonetheless, 
improvements regarding the issues of ‘money changing hands’ cannot substitute 
for greater attention to be paid to the aspects related to ‘ideas changing minds’. 
A series of influential studies claim that aid is most effective when allocated to 
countries with good policies. Collier & Dollar [1999], for instance, argued that a 
diversion of aid to countries where the poverty problem is soluble, due to ‘good 
policies’, could lift 82 million people out of poverty each year — against 30 million 
with the present pattern of aid allocation. In terms of absorptive capacity, 
Devarajan et. al. [2002] calculated, “for countries which have policies and 
institutions that are among the best … the point beyond which the growth impact 
is zero is reached when aid is around 30 percent of GDP. By contrast, the saturation 
point for countries with extremely weak policies and institutions is calculated to be 
around 6 percent of GDP.”  A document to the Development Committee of the 
World Bank and IMF [2003b] uses the concept of ‘good policies’ to identify 18 
priority countries for additional aid allocations — ranging from 20 to 100 per cent 
increases in current ODA levels. 
Not only do such studies stretch the reliability of the data — as they are often 
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tend to mask the extent of judgement and subjectivity involved. The definition  
of ‘good policies’ is frequently based on the so-called ‘CPIA index’ (country policy 
and institutional assessment) for which the World Bank country team assigns a 
value of between 1-6 for twenty different aspects of the economy. An average 
score of at least 3 is required for a country to be classified among those with  
so-called ‘good policies’. 
But several of these dimensions cannot be quantified or assessed objectively. 
For example, values are given as to whether the country has a distortionary 
minimum wage, excessive labour market regulations or too many public sector 
workers. It also asks whether the state is able to protect ‘most of the citizens most 
of the time’. It is obvious that calculating the CPIA index is more an art than a 
science, likely to be influenced as much by perceptions and prejudice than by facts 
and figures. 
Other studies that used different methods, different indicators or different 
levels of aggregation have concluded that aid is effective irrespective of the policy 
framework. UNDP’s report on development effectiveness [2003d] pointed out that 
while a good policy environment is important for achieving development results, 
no single set of policies can guarantee desired outcomes. It stated, “aid seems to 
improve social indicators regardless of the type of policy environment”. Mosley 
[1987] called the attention to the ‘micro-macro’ paradox whereby the impact of aid 
is observable when measured at the local level but becomes more difficult to 
detect at the aggregate level on economic growth. 
In short, ‘good policies’ cannot be readily measured, certainly not objectively. 
Moreover, the idea that there is some form of discontinuity between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ policies is inappropriate [Stewart & Wang, 2003]. All policy frameworks form a 
continuum; there is no clear break that can distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
ones. As beauty, it is in the eye of the beholder. On what basis would one argue, for 
instance, that Canada has better policies than say, Germany? Even if it were 
possible to rank countries according to one specific policy dimension, how could 
one pretend to be able to do so at the aggregate level, stating that a country’s 
policies are better than those of another country? This would be a daring 
endeavour; yet that is exactly what is being done — without meeting much 
objection or raising any alarm. 
The introduction of the ‘LICUS’ category (low-income countries under stress) 
is not unrelated to the fact that a strict policy of aid selectivity, based on the criteria 
of ‘good’ policies, is likely to by-pass many of the countries that are most in need of 
external support. As such, the LICUS concept is an attempt to keeping a degree of 
common sense within the context of merit-based aid allocations. 
It seems, if anything, that the debate about aid effectiveness — although much 
welcomed — has led several countries to become less generous in the 1990s. 
Indeed, the sceptics of foreign aid have eagerly used the claims about the 
importance of ‘good policies’ as a justification to cut ODA, which is unlikely  
to have helped any poor person in any poor country.   Jan Vandemoortele  19 
 
8  WHAT ARE THE “DON’TS” WHEN MAKING THE POLICY 
FRAMEWORK PRO-POOR? 
Three “don’ts” must be considered when trying to engender pro-poor policy 
frameworks. The first is not to be statistically illiterate. We saw how the story  
about MDG performance depends on the choice of the indicator and the level of 
aggregation, as well as the time horizon. In order to interpret the validity of the 
different versions of such stories, the stakeholders and the public at large need to 
improve their basic statistical literacy to be able to separate false arguments from 
valid ones — always admitting that any version of the story will inevitably include 
an element of judgement and subjectivity. 
The second “don’t” is not to make assumptions about the so-called pro-poor 
nature of specific policy reforms. It is seldom correct, for instance, to assume that 
what works for men will work equally benefit women. The same applies for 
macroeconomic policies; many of the alleged pro-poor policies frequently end up 
by-passing the poor, sometimes hurting them. Policy reforms that are presumed 
gender-neutral are in fact gender-blind; similarly, many policy reforms are often 
blind to the realities faced by the poor. Thus, one is never to be gullible vis-à-vis 
arguments about the pro-poor nature of macroeconomic stability, financial 
deregulation, trade liberalisation, user fees, narrow targeting, and aid selectivity. 
They must always be interpreted with caution. Just as the goldsmith handles  
gold — by rubbing, cutting and melting it — so must the validity of the pro-poor 
nature of reforms and investments be analysed within their specific context and 
circumstances. 
The third “don’t” is not to focus too narrowly on short-term results but to seek 
sustained partnerships — based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and 
national ownership. The drive to improve aid efficiency is certainly welcome but 
should not blind external partners to the reality that reaching the MDGs will 
require prolonged efforts. Success in the fight against river blindness and polio, for 
instance, did not occur overnight. External partners have to accept that over such 
prolonged periods of time some policy changes will inevitably be imperfect and 
that progress will not always be linear. There will be instances when events or 
reforms will be perceived as setbacks or as ‘bad’ policies — which have traditionally 
triggered a suspension in aid flows. But such drastic measures inherently contradict 
the pursuit for equal partnership and national ownership. Greater understanding 
and more flexibility on the part of external partners is therefore sine qua non for 
sustained partnerships. For many donors — bilateral as well as multilateral — this 
will require more active listening. Turning the development coin will change the 
way foreign aid is managed from a one-way street centred on ‘money changing 
hands’ to a two-way exchange of ‘ideas changing minds’. 
9  CAN GLOBAL TARGET MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
After several false dawns and missed opportunities, it might be tempting to 
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incorrect; global targets have made a difference in the past [Jolly, 2004]. Success 
stories with a target-driven approach to development — such as those against 
smallpox and polio, for iodised salt or increased access to safe water — indicate 
that they have seven elements in common. The seven “do’s” for operationalising 
the MDGs include: 
First, do express the vision of development in an inspiring but measurable 
way. Fuzzily formulated targets are as unhelpful as they are un-measurable. 
Targets for reducing human poverty must be specific; they cannot rely on vague 
assumptions, faulty indicators or inaccurate data. 
Second, do make sure that the targets are well known; they must reach the 
kitchen table. Targets must address presidents, prime ministers, parliamentarians, 
preachers, parents and primary school teachers. Public interest must be awakened 
and nurtured, ambition stirred and expectation aroused. The media has a critical 
role to play in keeping the eyes of the public on the prize. 
Third, do tailor the targets to the national context and local priorities. Targets 
must strike a judicious balance between ambition and realism. Over-ambitious 
targets are unlikely to trigger action; under-ambitious targets are unlikely to 
mobilise people and resources. The MDGs encourage all stakeholders to think 
global but to act local. Targets must be tailored and customised through an 
inclusive dialogue because only genuine participation will result in a consensus 
centred on a pro-poor development agenda. At the same time, tailored targets 
cannot turn into an escape clause, whereby the government hides inadequate 
political commitment behind targets that lack any sense of ambition or urgency. 
Fourth, do formulate intermediate targets. Long-term goals will not guarantee 
immediate action because they are not on the watch of today’s political leadership. 
Targets must be broken down in actionable propositions that can be achieved 
within the lifetime of the current government. Such intermediate targets must 
drive the shorter-term policy framework, budgetary priorities and decision about 
aid allocations, debt relief and trade reforms. A target-driven approach that pays 
insufficient attention to the immediate realities is likely to lead to a situation of 
‘meeting the target but missing the point’. 
Fifth, do constant monitoring. A journey to an agreed destination requires a 
map. If we are to reach the MDGs by 2015, good statistics are needed to document 
progress, to mobilise people and to design pro-poor policies based on hard 
evidence — not only on economic theory. Monitoring must use a few solid but 
easy-to-grasp indicators. It cannot be confined to specialists and experts alone; it 
must inform political leaders, parliamentarians, journalists, NGO activists and the 
general public. Monitoring must go beyond averages and aggregates. Data must 
be broken down according to gender, age, geographical location and socio-
economic groups. Comparing the performance of neighbouring localities and 
communities can be a catalyst for change. 
Sixth, do provide leadership. Targets that fostered success often had strong 
leadership behind them, frequently in the form of a public-private partnership — 
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These actors constantly nag policymakers — both globally and locally — to stay 
focused on the target. They also bring technical expertise and good campaign 
tactics. 
Seventh, do remember that nothing speaks louder than financial 
commitments. A balance must be kept between output and input targets. Results 
do not come for free; they carry a price tag. Two global input targets are the 20/20 
target for the national budget and the aid target of 0.7 per cent of rich countries’ 
income. Another relevant indicator is how much of the money budgeted for basic 
services actually reaches the unit of service delivery — such as a primary school or 
a rural health centre. The latter can serve as a proxy indicator of good governance. 
10  SUMMING UP 
We noted that in most countries the policy framework is not yet aligned with the 
MDGs and the fundamental objective of reducing human poverty. Poverty 
reduction is seen as an automatic by-product of economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability. Governments and their partners find it difficult to 
translate the concept of ‘pro-poor policies’ into practice. Equity continues to be the 
big absentee in most anti-poverty strategies. Although the objective of reducing 
human poverty features prominently on the international agenda, its actual 
pursuit remains conventional, unimaginative and often ineffective. It is a tragedy, 
in our view, that countries with high HIV prevalence rates have a macroeconomic 
framework that is not dissimilar from that for countries without HIV/Aids. The 
framework for the former should be much more accommodating and expansionary 
for the foreseeable future if they are to achieve the MDGs and overcome their 
HIV/Aids crisis. 
The poverty reduction strategies have to face the MDG challenge more 
explicitly. This will require a quantum leap in public investment, in domestic 
resources mobilisation, in external assistance and debt relief as well as in meaningful 
trade concessions. The era of targeted, small-scale anti-poverty interventions is over. 
If small is beautiful, big is now indispensable for reaching the MDGs. 
The question whether the MDGs and the PRSPs are enlarging pro-poor policy 
choices at the country level cannot be answered affirmatively — at least not yet — 
notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that business-as-usual will not turn 
the MDG targets into a practical reality by 2015. 
The seven steps mentioned above apply to both developing and developed 
countries, albeit in different ways. In the latter, for instance, opinion polls show 
similar levels of public support for foreign aid, irrespective of the country’s actual 
aid effort. Countries where such efforts are low register equally high levels of 
public support for foreign aid than countries that exceed the 0.7 per cent aid 
target — the so-called G.7 members. Differences in actual aid efforts often stem 
from a series of deliberate actions within donor countries — such as regular 
briefing of parliamentarians and journalists, a focus on success stories rather than 
on failures; setting time-bound targets for ODA; explicit monitoring of aid levels 
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politicians, community or religious leaders and celebrities in making the case for 
foreign aid. 
The seventh step closes the circle by turning the ‘development coin’ from the 
side of ‘ideas changing minds’ to the side of ‘money changing hands’. But that step 
should never come first — as is often the case in practice — because real change is 
ultimately an act of freedom; it is never an act of compliance with rules and 
conditionalities associated with ‘money changing hands’. 
The periodic consultations between a developing country and its external 
partners provide an opportunity for substantive discussions about the national 
development strategy. However, these events frequently turn into a ritual of 
compliance with the rules and conditionalities associated with ‘money changing 
hands’, which overshadows the dimension of ‘ideas changing minds’. We propose 
a Peer & Partner Review to make such consultations less asymmetric and more 
substantive. The current mode whereby a developing country faces 20-30 bilateral 
donors and multilateral institutions is not always conducive for an equal exchange 
and a frank debate. A Peer & Partner Review would involve peer countries and a 
more select group of external partners to review the anti-poverty strategy, 
programmes and financing plans. When Lesotho, for instance, would meet with its 
external partners, it could be joined by Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and 
perhaps another land-locked country such as Bolivia and Nepal. A person of 
distinction could also join the consultative process to help maintain the high moral 
ground. A Peer & Partner Review could combine existing mechanisms such as the 
peer review within NEPAD (New Partnership for African Development) and DAC 
(Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development).   Jan Vandemoortele  23 
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